Epistemology

How Randy Newman Solved Stanley Fish’s Credibility Problem

Stanley Fish, postmodern provocateur, gave a talk at Indiana University when I was a graduate student there in the late 1980s. He was then working on what would become There’s No Such Thing As Free Speech, And It’s a Good Thing, Too. Fish’s theme was social construction and oppression: We all are products of our

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Who succeeds in business — Garmong on *conceptual* thinking

In a recent post, philosopher-turned-businessman Robert Garmong made this observation: I’m now convinced that 99% of business success comes down to skill at defining and applying concepts. Those who are mere cogs in the machine, generally speaking, are those who don’t really understand the concepts. They may grasp the rules, but not the reasons. They

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Competing epistemological imperatives in the arts

Art critic Eric Gibson pronounces: “Objectivity is a cardinal rule in the discipline of art history. Mr. [Paul] Johnson’s book, by contrast, abounds in strong opinions.” (“Bold Strokes, Strong Opinions,” WSJ) But literary critic Tracy Kidder sneers: “As every graduate student knows, only a fool would try to think or bear witness to events objectively

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Code on gender feminist epistemology

Four quotations from Canadian philosopher Lorraine Code’s What Can She Know? Feminist Theory and the Construction of Knowledge. 1. On how perceptual knowledge is gendered: “Proposing that the sex of the knower is significant casts doubt both on the autonomy of reason and on the (residual) exemplary status of simple observational knowledge claims. The suggestion

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Hamminga on African epistemology

Two quotations from Bert Hamminga’s “Epistemology from the African Point of View”: “In the traditional African view, knowledge is not acquired by labor but ‘given’ by the ancestors. Second, it is immediately social: not ‘I’ know, but ‘we’ know. Thirdly, knowledge is not universal but local tribal: other tribes have different knowledge.” (p. 57) And:

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Is Austrian economics anti-empirical? (Horwitz, Caplan, Selgin, and Boettke)

[I’m re-posting this good discussion from 2012 at Cato Unbound.] An instructive trio of essays by economists at Cato Unbound about Austrian economics’ reputation — especially Mises’s praxeological version — for being strongly a priori rationalist: Is Austrian economics anti-empiricist? Steve Horwitz says no. Bryan Caplan says yes. George Selgin also says yes. To Selgin’s

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